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This paper studies the link between labor market regulations and the 
incentives of ﬁ rms to invest in the human capital of their emplo yees. 
We explore a ﬁ rm level data set across sev eral developing countries 
and compare the supply of formal training programs for ﬁ  rms exposed 
to different degrees of de facto labor regulations.  Our ﬁ  ndings 
show that a more ﬂ  exible labor code tends to be associated with a 
smaller investment in job tr aining. However, this effect is small and 
heterogeneous. Reforms that simultaneously accelerate the diffusion of 
temporary contracts and increase the protection of permanent workers 
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This paper studies the link between labor market regulations and the incentives of firms to invest 
in the human capital of their employees. We explore a firm level data set across several 
developing countries and compare the supply of formal training programs for firms exposed to 
different degrees of de facto labor regulations.  Our findings show that a more flexible labor code 
tends to be associated with a smaller investment in job training. However, this effect is small and 
heterogeneous. Reforms that simultaneously accelerate the diffusion of temporary contracts and 
increase the protection of permanent workers tend to generate negative effects on the firm’s 
investment in human capital.  
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1. Introduction 
In a context of increasing openness and international competition, several firms in 
developing countries struggle to constantly adapt their workforce to new technologies 
and organizational structures in order to remain competitive. Because skilled labor is 
relatively scarce in developing countries, job training emerges as an important tool to 
foster productivity. Nevertheless, the levels of this investment are surprisingly low in 
developing countries, especially when compared to those of developed countries. The 
investment in human capital is also important from an individual perspective since most 
of an individual’s human capital is accumulated throughout life, either on-the-job or 
outside (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003). This investment in adult life is particularly 
important for the older and less educated workers, whose skills accumulated at school, 
have substantially depreciated and run a higher risk of social exclusion. Hence, 
policymakers are increasingly interested in understanding the main determinants of this 
investment. This paper investigates the role of labor market regulations in shaping the 
incentives of firms to invest in formal training programs.
2 We explore a large firm level 
data set across several developing countries and compare the supply of formal training 
programs in firms exposed to different degrees of de facto labor regulations.   
There is a large ongoing debate on the benefits and costs of labor market 
regulations in developed and developing countries. While the efficiency costs of labor 
regulations have been discussed and documented by many, there is much scarcer 
evidence on the potential benefits of labor market regulations. Only a balanced analysis 
of the benefits and costs of regulations will give policymakers a full assessment of the 
effects of regulations on total welfare. One possible channel through which regulations 
might affect welfare in the economy is through the investment in job training. It has been 
argued that strict labor regulations might create longer term employment relationship 
which could, in turn, create a greater incentive for firms to invest in firm or sector 
specific job training (e.g., Wasmer, 2006). If this is true, and firms in developing 
countries under invest in job training, this increased incentive to invest should be 
                                                 
2 The analysis focuses exclusively on job training. It excludes the investment in skills for the unemployed 
or other training-related active labor market policies. We also restrict the attention to formal training 
programs. This is a shortcoming of most of the literature since it is very difficult to gather data on the 
informal job training.      2
considered as a potential benefit of labor market regulations. However, this positive link 
is not consensual. It is possible that strict labor market regulations increase the bargaining 
power of a small group of protected workers, leading to higher wages and to a reduced 
investment in job training (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). Whether or not stricter 
labor market regulations lead to an increased investment in job training is, therefore, an 
empirical question. To our knowledge, the potential benefits of this channel have not 
been rigorously explored empirically in the context of developing countries. 
This paper explores a large firm level data set across more than 65 developing 
countries throughout the world to investigate the link between strictness of the de facto 
labor regulations and job training. The data we use is particularly interesting to study this 
topic. It collects simultaneously information on the incidence of job training and on 
several firm characteristics, including the degree of enforcement of labor regulation faced 
by each firm. Our findings strongly support that a stricter labor code is associated with a 
higher investment by firms in the human capital of their employees. Training incidence 
for a firm facing the 90th percentile of the enforcement of labor regulation relative to a 
firm facing percentile 10th is 2.1 percentage points higher in a country with a rigid labor 
regulation (that is, in the 90th percentile of the rigidity of employment index) than in a 
country with a less rigid labor regulation (i.e., in the 10
th percentile). Nevertheless, the 
magnitude of the effect is quantitatively small (average training incidence in our sample 
is 45.2%).
3 The findings also suggest significant heterogeneity by types of regulation. 
While stricter hiring regulations and rigidity in the working hours are associated with a 
higher investment in job training, stricter firing costs tend to be associated with reduced 
investment in job training by employers. Therefore, labor market reforms that accelerate 
the diffusion of temporary contracts and, simultaneously, increase the protection of 
regular workers reduce the incentives of firms to invest in the human capital of their 
employees. We show that these findings are robust to several robustness checks. 
                                                 
3 Black and Lynch (1998) report that approximately 81% of the firms in their sample offer formal training 
programs in the U.S.. However, one should be cautious when comparing figures across countries which use 
different data sets. A major problem in this literature (also emphasized by Bassanini et al., 2005) is the lack 
of comparability in the training data. Household level surveys typically collect information on whether an 
individual received formal training or on training hours (e.g., Arulampalam et al., 2003). Firm level surveys 
collect information on the share of employees trained, training days or hours or total training expenditure 
(e.g., Barrett and O’Connell, 2001).    3
Determining the causal effect of labor market regulations on the incentive of firms 
to invest in job train is a difficult task. Labor market regulations are usually set at a 
national level and tend to change very infrequently over time. Empirically, this implies 
that there is little variation in the de jure law - either over time, across workers, or across 
geographic locations - that can be used to identify the effects of changes in the law on the 
incentives to provide job training. Simply exploring cross country variation in the de jure 
regulation is likely to raise several problems. In particular, it is possible that the degree of 
rigidity of the labor law is itself correlated with unobservable country characteristics (like 
quality of the institutions or education of the workforce) which, in turn, are also likely to 
affect the incentive to provide job training. Alternatively, it is also possible that countries 
that experience less training (e.g., due to higher worker turnover rates) have a greater 
demand to reform labor code in order to protect more the existent jobs. In this case, even 
labor market reforms are likely to be endogenous.   
In this paper, we explore firm level data and within country variation in the 
enforcement of labor regulation.
4 We measure enforcement of labor regulations with the 
number of visits made by labor inspections to each firm. Our assumption is that labor 
regulations are more binding when firms with similar characteristics face a stricter 
enforcement of the labor law. However, simply comparing training incidence for firms 
located in the same country (and hence subject to the same de jure labor law) but subject 
to different degrees of enforcement of labor regulation is likely to yield biased estimates 
on the causal effect of the labor law. The main reason is that variation in the enforcement 
of the labor law is likely to be non random. For example, in our data, enforcement of the 
labor law tends to be stricter for larger and better firms as well as for firms located in the 
capital city. Our empirical specification will include several observable firm 
characteristics that determine differences across firms in the degree of enforcement of the 
labor law. Moreover, we will also explore the differential effect of enforcement in 
countries with different degrees of rigidities in the labor law, after accounting for country 
fixed effects, firm characteristics and for the degree of enforcement of labor regulations 
(as well as other types of regulations). This approach allows us to see how training 
                                                 
4 Most of the literature on the effects of labor regulations has not emphasized the importance of 
enforcement of labor regulations. Exceptions include Boeri and Jimeno, 2005, Caballero, Cowan, Engel 
and Micco, 2004, Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman, 2006, Almeida and Carneiro, 2007, 2008a).   4
incidence differs for firms with similar observable characteristics but facing different 
degrees of enforcement of labor regulations in countries with strict labor codes relatively 
to countries with more flexible labor codes. This approach is similar in spirit to a 
differences-in-differences approach as proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
Controlling for country fixed effects allow us to isolate the effect of unobserved country 
characteristics that are likely to be correlated with de facto labor regulations and with 
training incidence (e.g., level of development in the country). By controlling for firm 
characteristics (e.g., age, size, sector composition) we account for the differences across 
firms that could be simultaneously correlated with training incidence and with the degree 
of enforcement in the country. E.g., larger and more visible firms could be more likely to 
be subject to labor inspections in countries where the labor law is more rigid. Controlling 
for the degree of enforcement of labor regulations faced by firms, allow us to account for 
(unobservable) firm characteristics that could be simultaneously correlated with 
enforcement of the law and with the investment in job training, in countries with different 
degrees of rigidities in the labor law. We will also control for the overall degree of 
enforcement of other regulations (e.g., fiscal, health and safety, sanitation and 
environmental regulations).  
This paper is related to different strands of the literature. On the one hand, it 
relates to the work linking firm characteristics with the incidence of job training.
5 In the 
context of developed countries, the empirical findings suggest that larger, capital 
intensive and more productive firms tend to train more (e.g., Black and Lynch, 2001, 
Frazis, Gittleman and Joyce, 2000). The incidence of job training, both at the country 
individual and at the firm level, also tends to be higher for a more skilled workforce (e.g., 
Bassanini et al, 2005). There is also some evidence documenting that firms adopting 
more flexible workplace practices and performance based schemes tend to offer more job 
training (e.g., Gittleman, Horrigan and Joyce, 1998). In the context of developing 
countries the evidence on employer provided training is much scarcer and often based on 
individual country case studies. For a detailed description of training programs and its 
                                                 
5 A related question, which we will not address in this paper, is whether training has any effect on firm 
productivity (e.g., Barrett and O’Connell, 2001 or Lopez-Acevedo and Tan, 2003) or whether the returns to 
job training are high (e.g., Almeida and Carneiro, 2008b). Machin and Vignoles (2001), review some of 
this literature.    5
financing in developing countries see Middleton, Ziderman and Van Adams (1993) and 
Canagarajah, Dar and Murphy (2001). One exception is Rosholm et al (2007) who 
analyze the wage return to the investment in job training using data for Kenya and 
Zambia. They find evidence of large wage returns to job training (approximately 20%) 
these countries. They also show that the returns tend to increase with firm size and with 
training duration.
6 Frazer (2006) shows that workers in Ghana are willing to finance firm 
specific training, as they might be able to reap the benefits of this investment by setting 
up their own firms. More closely related to our work is Pierre and Scarpetta (2004). They 
explore the same firm level survey data that we do (although for a smaller sample), and 
link the investment of firms in job training with firm characteristics. They find that larger, 
public owned firms and more innovative firms tend to train more.  
On the other hand, the paper relates to the large literature quantifying the effects 
of labor market regulations on efficiency and equity outcomes. While the efficiency costs 
of labor regulations have been discussed and documented extensively, both in developing 
and developed countries, its effects on redistribution and equity effects have been much 
less studied.
7  In particular, one possible channel through which regulations might affect 
welfare and redistribution in the economy is through the investment in job training.
8 
Wasmer (2006) argues that employment protection creates longer-term employment 
relationships, which are necessary to invest in job training specific to a firm or sector. 
This could actually be a potential benefit of having employment protection regulations if 
firms are under-investing in this area. To our knowledge, the potential benefits of this 
channel have not been rigorously explored empirically in the context of developing 
countries. Pierre and Scarpetta (2004) tackle this issue but they explore variation in the 
                                                 
6 Rosholm at al (2007) and Frazer (2006) explore the same data that we do but for three African countries 
(Zambia, Kenya and Ghana). In these countries the survey is a matched employer-employee data set with 
information on job training in the workers module. This module is not the case for most developing 
countries, where training information is only available at the firm level.   
7 While there is some consensus that stricter labor regulations reduce unemployment turnover, there is more 
ambiguity on the overall effects of regulations on employment and unemployment levels. The effects of 
regulations on value added and productivity have been less studied but the evidence seems to suggest that 
there are also negative effects (e.g., Besley and Burgess, 2004, and Micco and Pages, 2006 and Almeida 
and Carneiro, 2008a). 
8 Labor regulations might also improve redistribution in the economy through the job-to-job and activity-
inactivity transitions. The reduced evidence available for developing countries suggests that regulations 
tend to redistribute against the most vulnerable groups (see e.g., Heckman and Pages, 2004, and Almeida 
and Carneiro, 2007, for evidence in Latin America). Labor regulations can also be used to insure workers 
who would, otherwise, not be able to insure against the risk of becoming unemployed (e.g., Kugler, 2007).    6
manager’s perception on how binding are labor laws. Their findings are, therefore, harder 
to interpret and subject to stronger endogeneity concerns. Reassuringly, both papers find 
that stricter labor codes tend to be associated with more job training. However, they do 
not differentiate their analysis by types of regulations.  
For developed countries the link between job training and the stringency of the 
labor law is mixed. On the one hand, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) argue that there are 
complementarities between regulation regimes and training systems, and that reducing 
firing costs and increasing employment flexibility could reduce the incentives to train. 
Their evidence focuses mainly on Germany versus the US. Bishop (1991) also finds 
evidence of a positive correlation between the incidence of formal training and the firm’s 
firing costs. This evidence is consistent with labor regulations increasing the adjustment 
costs of firms through the hiring/firing of workers, and resorting to training instead. 
Moreover, it is also consistent with the argument that the stricter the labor regulations, the 
greater it will be the wage compression (i.e., the greater the wedge between the worker’s 
productivity and the labor cost) and the more profitable would be the investment in job 
training for firms. Therefore, the combination of wage compression and high labor 
adjustment costs could favor the investment in job training. On the other hand, it is 
possible that stricter firing regulations make it more costly for firms to dismiss less able 
(or less suitable) employees, creating a more heterogeneous workforce. To the extent that 
training and ability are complements, firms with a more heterogeneous workforce should 
train less. Bassanini et. al. (2005) exploring household level data across 13 European 
countries and exploring cross country-time series variation on the de jure labor 
regulations, find some evidence of a negative correlation between employment protection 
of regular employees and the incidence of job training. However, they also find that a 
reduction in hiring regulations (e.g., through the diffusion of temporary contracts) is 
associated with a decrease in job training. Reassuringly, our findings, although exploring 
a very different methodology and data sets, will qualitatively be very similar to theirs.    
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides 
descriptive statistics for the incidence of job training in the sample. Section 3 proposes 
the empirical approach exploring a differences-in-differences methodology. Section 4.1 
presents the main findings linking labor market regulations and job training and section   7
4.2 discusses the potential endogeneity of the enforcement of the labor law. Section 5 
presents sensitivity analysis and heterogeneity of the effects. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 2. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The main data set we use is a large firm level data collected by the World Bank, 
Enterprise Surveys, covering 66 developing countries.
9 The surveys were conducted 
between 2002 and 2005 and the samples were designed to be representative of the 
population of firms in the sectors covered in each country. Although only one wave of 
data per country is included in our sample (the most recent wave), the information 
available in the survey has several advantages for analyzing this topic. First, the data is 
based on a common questionnaire across a large set of countries, yielding comparable 
information on several firm level characteristics. In particular, the survey collects 
information on age, size and geographical location, 2-digit ISIC sector of activity, export 
intensity, foreign and public ownership, and the human capital composition of the 
workforce. Table A1 in the appendix defines all the variables used in the analysis. Our 
final sample includes 35,229 firms distributed across a wide range of sectors 
(Manufacturing, 73%, Construction, 4%, Services, 21% and Agro-Industry, 2%). Within 
Manufacturing several industries are covered – auto and auto components, beverages, 
chemicals, electronics, food, garments, leather, metals and machinery, non-metallic and 
plastic materials, paper, textiles, wood and furniture. Table A2 reports the countries 
included in our sample: 18 countries in Africa (10% sample), 4 countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa (8% sample), 12 countries in East and South Asia (33.3% sample), 
27 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (32.9% sample), and 10 countries in 
Latin America (16% sample). Second, the data collects information on whether the firm 
provides formal job training to their workers. This is based on the survey question “Do 
you offer formal (beyond “on-the-job”) training to your permanent employees?”. It is 
worth nothing that this job training program is offered by the firm but it is not necessarily 
                                                 
9 This data set is also known as Investment Climate Surveys and has been used for studying this and other 
topics (see e.g., Svensson, 2003, Almeida and Carneiro, 2008a, Almeida and Fernandes, 2008, Pierre and 
Scarpetta, 2004, and Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier and Pagés, 2007). Previous versions of this project 
within the World Bank include the Regional Program on Enterprise Development collecting firm and 
worker level data in Sub-Saharan Africa countries for a decade (e.g., Rosholm et al, 2007, Frazer, 2006), 
and the World Business Environment Survey.   8
fully financed by the firm itself. Depending on the country, region or sector of activity 
training can be subsidized by the government (e.g., through training levies) or supported 
by the workers (e.g., through lower wages). The programs might also be organized by the 
firms themselves, by training institutes (e.g., public training institutions). Third, the 
survey collects information on a number of inspections faced by the firm relating to 
labor, fiscal, health and safety, environmental and municipal inspections. We use this 
information to proxy the degree of enforcement of regulation faced by each firm, after 
conditioning on several observable firm characteristics (Almeida and Carneiro, 2008a, 
follow a similar approach). Accounting for the enforcement of the law is particularly 
important in the context of developing countries, where there is a large gap between the 
law stated on the books (de jure) and its effective implementation (de facto). There 
enforcement tends to be weak and evasion of the law is large. In our empirical approach, 
we will explore within country variation in the enforcement of labor regulation to identify 
the effects of the labor law on training incidence after conditioning on several firm 
characteristics and on the overall enforcement of the law faced by the firm.  
We use information on the de facto labor regulations from the World Bank Doing 
Business Data set (e.g. Botero at al, 2004). This data measures the overall degree of 
rigidity of the labor code (through the rigidity of employment index) but collects also 
disaggregated information on hiring, firing and hours regulations. In particular, we use 
information on four labor indices: rigidity of employment, a difficulty of hiring, rigidity 
in working hours, difficulty of firing, and on firing costs.
10 Finally, we also explore 
country level governance indicators, between 2000 and 2005, in Kaufmann and Kraay 
(2007)
11, and on number of procedures to start a business, also taken from the World 
Bank Doing Business dataset, between 2003 and 2006.  
                                                 
10 The rigidity of employment index is the average of three indices: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of 
hours index and a difficulty of firing index. The difficulty of hiring index is closely linked to the 
application of fixed-term contracts. The rigidity of hours index relates to the possibility of having night, 
weekend and overtime work. The firing cost indicator measures the cost of advance notice requirements, 
severance payments and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker (and is expressed in weekly 
wages). Higher values of the indices indicate more rigid labor regulations. 
11 Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. Rule of Law captures the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society (e.g., quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence). Control of Corruption captures the 
extent in which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests. Regulatory Quality is the ability of the government to   9
We define the incidence of training at the firm level with a dummy variable 
assuming the value one if the firm reports having offered a formal training program to its 
employees. Since the data set is harmonized across countries, we hope that the 
measurement error problems in the training variable are not too severe. However, the 
interpretation of what a formal training program is might differ across countries, or even 
within countries across firm size or sector of activity. Our empirical approach minimizes 
this problem since we always control for country and sector fixed effects and, therefore, 
we explore within country and within sector variation in job training.
12 Moreover, we will 
also test the robustness of our findings to time invariant effects for each combination of 
country, city, sector and size. To check whether our variable of interest is economically 
meaningful, we have analyzed the relation between the average propensity to train (at the 
country level) and different country characteristics, like degree of education, openness, 
technology adoption and labor productivity (measured as value added per employee).  
Figures 1 to 4 report sensible patterns for our data at the country level. They document a 
strong and positive correlation between investment in job training at the country level and 
the level of development in the country (captured by GDP per capita), its human capital 
composition (captured by years of schooling of the population), the degree of openness 
(captured by the trade as a % of GDP) and the degree of innovation and technology 
adoption (captured by the investment in R&D as a percentage of GDP). Although these 
plots cannot be interpreted as causal, we interpret this evidence as being suggestive that 
our job training measure captures an economically meaningful activity.
13 These 
correlations are also in line with what others have found in the context of developed 
countries (see e.g., Bassanini et al, 2005). Figure 5 presents the link between an overall 
                                                                                                                                                 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
12 It is plausible that managers interpret differently the meaning of formal training programs. This could 
introduce measurement error in the dependent variable in our empirical work. If this measurement error is 
classic, this is not a problem. However, biases could result if the measurement error is systematically 
related to firm characteristics of interest (like enforcement of the labor law). It is worth stressing that the 
survey only covers formal training and, therefore, episodes of informal training are not considered. This 
will probably lead to an underestimation in the total the amount of training provided, especially in small 
and micro firms, where most of the training is likely to be informal (Barron et al, 1987). 
13 These correlations are robust to alternative openness and innovation measures taken from the Enterprise 
Surveys and aggregated at the country level (e.g., share exporting firms, share firms with foreign licenses, 
share of firms with an ISO certification). The propensity to train is also negatively correlated with 
education measures taken from the Enterprise Surveys (e.g., share of workers with less than 5 years of 
education).    10
de jure measure of labor rigidity and the intensity to train at the country level. There is a 
negative, though insignificant, cross country correlation between stringency of de jure 
labor law and training incidence. However, at the country level it is very difficult to 
control for several unobserved country characteristics, policies and institutions that are 
likely to affect both variables. In the next section we investigate this link more in depth 
exploring within country variation in training incidence and in the de facto labor 
regulation faced by each firm.   
Finally, figures 6 and 7 document significant heterogeneity in the incidence of job 
training, by firm size, across regions and income levels in our sample. While 45% of the 
firms in our sample offer formal job training programs to their employees, this number 
increases to 61.4% in the set of large firms (and is 23.7% for the micro firms) Training 
incidence is lower among the smaller firms even across all the regions and income groups 
considered in our sample. These patterns hold separately for manufacturing and services, 
though training incidence in services is smaller than in manufacturing sectors (not 
reported). Across regions and income group, we also find that the incidence of training at 
the firm level is higher among innovative firms, exporters or firms with foreign 
participation (not reported).  
 
3. Empirical Methodology  
We are interested in analyzing the link between labor regulations and training 
incidence. As discussed in the introduction, theory is inconclusive about the predicted 
sign. On the one hand, a stricter employment protection law could lead to longer job 
tenures and, therefore, to an increased investment in job training (Wasmer, 2006). 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) also argue that, in the presence of labor market rigidities, 
there could be complementarities between regulation regimes and training systems. On 
the other hand, a stricter labor codes might increase the bargaining power of the insiders 
and lead to higher wages and to lower investment of firms (e.g., Mortenssen and 
Pissarides, 1999). Alternatively, it is also possible that stricter firing regulations make it 
more costly for firms to dismiss less able (or less suitable) employees, creating a more 
heterogeneous workforce. To the extent that training and ability are complements, firms 
with a more heterogeneous workforce should train less.   11
Our empirical framework considers profit-maximizing firms deciding whether or 
not to provide on the job training to its workforce. A firm will decide to offer training if 
this decision is expected to increase its profits, i.e., if the benefits from this decision are 
larger than the costs. Let  ijc
* π  be the profits of a firm i in industry j in country c. We 
assume that: 

















                                      (1) 
where,  ijc Train  is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i, operating in sector j and 
country c, reports providing training. Since  ijc
* π  is unobserved, equation (1) cannot be 
estimated directly. Therefore, we assume that  ijc
* π  is a function of several observable 
firm, industry, and country characteristics. In particular, we assume that  ijc
* π  is linear so 
that,  ijc c j ijc ijc ijc c ijc X E E R ε μ μ β γ δ π + + + + + = *
* , where  c R  is a measure of the de jure 
labor regulation in country,  ijc E  is a measure of the enforcement of labor regulations and 
ijc X  captures firm level characteristics of interest of firm i (including firm size, age of the 
firm, firm location, exporter, foreign and public ownership dummies).  c η  and  j μ  are 
time invariant effects capturing country and 2-digit industry unobserved characteristics. 
Finally,  ijc ε  captures unobserved firm characteristics correlated with training incidence. 
Using this functional form, the probability that firm i offers training is given by: 
                                  .) * Pr( ) 1 Pr( c j ijc ijc ijc c ijc ijc X E E R Train μ μ β γ δ ε − − − − − > = =    (2)  
Assuming that the residuals  ijc ε  are normally distributed, equation (2) can be estimated 
by maximum likelihood (probit). We do not cluster the standard errors.
14 We measure 
ijc E  with the number of visits made by labor inspectors to the firm and  c R  with the 
Doing Business measures of the de jure labor market regulations. 
The main coefficient of interest is δ . Having all else constant, δ  quantifies the 
percentage point difference in the probability of a firm offering job training for firms 
facing a different degree of enforcement of labor regulations in countries with strict de 
                                                 
14 However, if we were to allow for correlation in training incidence across firms in the same country and 
industry, the magnitude and significance of the main empirical findings would be very similar (available on 
request).   12
jure law versus countries with looser regulation. This approach is similar in spirit to a 
differences-in-differences approach (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Having all else 
constant, we compare the effect of labor regulations for firms located in the same country 
(and hence subject to the same de jure labor law) but facing different degrees of 
enforcement of labor regulation (i.e., subject to the same de facto labor law). It is worth 
stressing that we are not exploring the variation in the enforcement of labor regulation 
alone. Rather, we explore the differential effect of enforcement in countries with different 
degrees of rigidities in the labor law, after controlling for country fixed effects, several 
firm characteristics and for the degree of enforcement of labor regulations. Controlling 
for country level fixed effects allow us to account for unobserved country characteristics 
that are likely to be correlated with de facto labor regulations and with training incidence 
(e.g., level of development in the country). The inclusion of several firm characteristics 
(like age, size or industrial composition) also allow us to account for the differences 
across firms that could be simultaneously correlated with training incidence and with the 
degree of enforcement in the labor law. For example, larger and more visible firms are 
more likely to be subject to labor inspections in countries where the labor law is more 
rigid. Finally, controlling by the degree of enforcement of labor regulations, we account 
for (unobservable) firm characteristics that could be simultaneously correlated with the 
enforcement and with training in countries with different degrees of rigidities in the labor 
law.  
If we were to identify the effects of regulation on the incidence of training 
exploring only cross country information on the de jure labor regulation, the 
identification of the effect on training would come only from cross country differences in 
the law as it is stated in the books. This would raise three important problems. First, 
countries that differ in the degree of stringency of the labor law are likely to differ in 
several other omitted policies and institutions, like their level of development, rule of 
law, quality of institutions, which could also affect the investment in job training. 
Second, countries with higher labor turnover are less likely to invest in job training and 
could arguably demand a stricter labor code. This could raise the problem of causality 
from labor market outcomes to labor regulation rather than the other way around. Finally, 
in the context of developing countries there is a large gap between the de jure regulation   13
and the de facto law faced by firms since compliance is law and evasion tends to be large. 
The proposed empirical approach, tries to mitigate these problems by exploring within 
country variation in the enforcement of the law after controlling for country fixed effects, 
by the degree of enforcement of the labor law and by several firm characteristics.  
Table 2 starts by documenting the relationship between training incidence and 
several firm level characteristics ( ijc X ), which will serve as controls in our main analysis. 
The table reports the marginal effects at mean values of the variables of interest. All the 
specifications control for country fixed effects and for 2-digit ISIC sector fixed effects. 
The latter is important because firms in the same industry are likely to face a similar 
production technology, product demand or degree of product competition. All these 
characteristics are likely to affect the incentives of firms to invest in job training. 
Moreover, it is also possible that the definition of a formal training program differs across 
industries and countries. We hope that this set of firm and country level controls 
minimizes the potential problem of reverse causality (i.e., causality running from 
incidence of training to strictness of enforcement of labor regulations) that plagues most 
of the cross country work. 
Column (1) in table 2 reports the relation between training incidence on the one 
hand and firm size, age and location on the other. As found by others, larger and younger 
firms are more likely to offer training (e.g., Frazis, Gittleman and Joyce, 2000). For 
example, firms with more than 100 employees are at least 40 percentage points more 
likely to offer training programs than micro firms (less than 10 employees). One possible 
explanation for this is that there are economies of scale in training provision that only 
larger firms can exploit. Almeida and Carneiro (2008a) find evidence that there are large 
fixed costs in the provision of formal job training programs. Younger firms in developing 
countries are also more likely to offer job training but the magnitude of the effect is close 
to zero.
15 We also find that firms located in the capital city or in large cities (defined has 
having more than 1 million inhabitants) are also more likely to offer job training. Column 
(2) includes as additional controls the degree of firm openness, captured by a dummy 
variable assuming the value one if the firm exports and three dummy variables for 
                                                 
15  A quadratic term on age of the firm is included. The point estimate (not reported) is always statistically 
insignificant.    14
whether the firm has a minority (less than 50%), majority (50%-99%) or full foreign 
ownership. The findings clearly show that more open firms are also more likely to invest 
in the human capital of their employees. Moreover, the greater the share of foreign capital 
in the firm’s total capital, the more likely it is that firms offer training programs. For 
example, all else constant a firm with full foreign ownership is 8 percentage points more 
likely to train their employees than a fully domestic owned firm.
16 In column (3), we do 
not find evidence that, all else constant, firms with a public ownership differ in their 
intensity to train. Column (4) shows that there is also a strong positive correlation 
between average schooling of the workforce and the incidence of job training. This 
correlation is still positive (though it does not remain statistically significant) if we use 
share of skilled workers as a proxy for the worker’s human capital (column 5). The 
complementarity between the worker’s education and the firm’s investment in job 
training as been documented extensively in the literature for developing and developed 
countries using also household level data (e.g., Lillard and Tan, 1992, Altonji and 
Spletzer, 1991, Mincer, 1996 or Leuven, 2004 for a survey). To maximize the number of 
observations, the variables in column (5) will serve as controls in our base specification 
throughout the paper. Finally, column (6) reports that the main findings in column (5) 
would remain robust if we allowed the industry fixed effects to vary by country.   
4. Labor Market Regulations and Investment in Skills 
4.1. Main Empirical Findings 
 
Table 3 reports the point estimates for δ  under alternative sets of controls, and 
using always an overall index of employment rigidity capturing simultaneously rigidities 
in firing, in hiring and in adjusting the working hours. All the specifications include 
                                                 
16 The positive correlation between openness and the investment in skills does not necessarily imply 
causality. For example, it is possible that foreign ownership self select into the “best” domestic firms. In 
this case, the positive coefficient would be simply caused by the cherry picking of firms (see e.g., Almeida, 
2007 or Tybout, 2000). Almeida and Fernandes (2008) also show that that more innovative firms also tend 
to be more open which in turn could be driving the results if the investment in physical and in human 
capital are correlated. The results (not reported) show that the link is robust to adding controls for whether 
the firm has recently adopted new technology, the share of R&D in total sales, whether the firm as an ISO 
certification and the manager’s years of education.  The findings also show that, all else constant, there is a 
positive link between technology adoption and the investment in human capital at the firm level and 
between the manager’s education and the investment in human capital.    15
country and 2-digit industry fixed effects (total of 27 categories). The coefficient on  ijc X  
are very similar from those reported in table 2 and, therefore, we abstract from presenting 
and discussing them here. Column (1) shows that, after controlling for country and 
industry fixed effects and for the degree of enforcement of the labor law, the interaction 
term is positive and statistically significant. This implies that firms exposed to a stricter 
enforcement of the law tend to offer more job training, relative to firms facing looser 
enforcement, in countries with more stringent labor regulations. In the last row of the 
table, we use the point estimate on δ  to quantify the differential effect in training 
incidence by reporting the magnitude of the impact of labor rigidity on training incidence. 
Using the estimate in column (1) we obtain the differential 0.0218. This number implies 
that the incidence of job training for a firm facing the 90th percentile of the enforcement 
of labor regulation relative to a firm facing percentile 10th is 2.1 percentage points higher 
in a country with a rigid labor regulation (that is, in the 90th percentile of the rigidity of 
employment index like Mozambique) than in a country with a less rigid labor regulation 
(i.e., in the 10
th percentile like Mauritius or Armenia). This percentage point difference in 
training incidence is not particularly large if we consider that the average incidence of job 
training in our sample is 45.2%.  
The remaining columns of table 3 will show that this positive correlation between 
training incidence and labor regulations will be robust to several firm and country level 
controls. Moreover, the point estimate on the interaction term between enforcement and 
labor regulation will be quite stable and remains significant across specifications 
(approximately 0.002). This implies that that the incidence of job training for a firm 
facing the 90th percentile of the enforcement of labor regulation relative to a firm facing 
percentile 10th is approximately 3.5 percentage points higher in a country with a rigid 
labor regulation than in a country with a less rigid labor regulation.   
In column (2) of table 3 we include the several firm characteristics reported in 
column (5) of table 2. As discussed above these characteristics are linked to the intensity 
to provide job training and are also related to the incidence of labor inspections.
17 One 
                                                 
17 A regression of the (log) number of visits made by labor inspectors on firm characteristics shows that 
larger, older and more open firms are more likely to receive visits from labor inspectors (after controlling 
for country and sector fixed effects). These correlations are robust to controlling for the total number of 
inspections.         16
potential problem with this specification is that the interaction term could be capturing 
the fact that firms receiving more labor inspections are also more likely to receive 
inspections related with other types of regulations (e.g., fiscal, environmental, heath and 
safety or municipal). This could happen, for example, if inspectors have a performance 
pay scheme encouraging inspections in larger firms (e.g. Cardoso and Lage, 2007 argue 
that this happens in Brazil) or if the main objective of inspections (either labor or other) is 
to extract rents (rather than to enforce the law). To minimize this problem, column (3) 
includes as additional control the interaction between labor market regulations and the 
total number of inspections made to each firm (as well as the total number of inspections 
in level). The inclusion of these variables is likely to address this concern as long as the 
probability of having an inspection in order to extract rents is not higher for labor than for 
other inspections, in countries with different degrees of rigidity of labor laws. In column 
(4) the point estimate of interest almost doubles and remains statistically significant. This 
suggests that part of the variation in the enforcement of labor regulations, in countries 
with labor codes with different degrees of rigidity, is actually explained by total 
enforcement of the law within the country.   
In the remaining columns of table 3 we test the robustness of the main findings to 
several robustness tests. One source of concern could be driven by the fact that de jure 
labor market regulations are correlated with other country level characteristics which 
could affect training differently depending of the degree of enforcement of labor 
regulations. Heckman and Pagés (2004) and Botero et al (2004) show that the degree of 
stringency of employment protection laws tends to decrease with income levels. The 
results in column (4), controlling for differences across countries in GDP per capita, do 
not change. Results are also robust to the inclusion of alternative measures of a country’s 
institutional quality - rule of law, regulatory quality and the government control of 
corruption - which are likely to be simultaneously correlated with the stringency of labor 
market regulations and also with the incidence of job training. For example, if countries 
with a more stringent labor regulation also tend to have more corrupt governments where 
public power is exercised for private gain, then it is possible that training incidence is 
affected simply because rent extraction in larger and best firms. Column (5) to (7) also 
report that the point estimates for δ  remain unchanged.    17
Finally, we test whether labor regulations are simply capturing the effect of entry 
regulations. Indeed, it is quite plausible that the political economy that leads to the 
enactment of job security regulations in some countries also leads to the ratification of 
regulations on firm entry. Since Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) show that entry and exit 
of firms explains a large share of total labor reallocation they are also likely to affect 
labor turnover at the firm level, which in turn affects the investment in job training. To 
minimize this concern we include as additional control the interaction of labor regulations 
with a measure of how costly is firm entry at the country level (captured by the number 
of procedures to start a business) multiplied by the enforcement of labor regulations. The 
findings, reported in columns (8) remain again unchanged.  
Reassuringly, throughout columns (5) to (8) of table 3 we always find that the 
effect of the interaction of labor inspections with alternative measures of the quality of 
the country institutions and entry regulations is never statistically significant. This gives 
us additional confidence that the strong effect that we identify on job training is indeed 
coming from the differential effect of labor market regulations through the enforcement 
of the labor law.   
Table 4 reports additional robustness checks over our basic specification (column 
(4) of table 3). As discussed above one concern could be that labor inspections serve 
primarily as a mean of rent extraction. In this case the coefficient on δ  would be biased 
upwards simply because more productive firms could be inspected more often in 
countries where regulations are stricter (and are also more likely to offer job training 
programs). In table 4, we argued that including the interaction of labor regulations with 
the total inspections minimized this concern. In columns (1) to (3) of table 4, we test 
whether the main findings are robust to the inclusion as additional controls the interaction 
of the rigidity in labor regulations with measures of how likely are inspections to serve as 
means of rent extraction (as well as the variables in levels). We speculate that labor 
inspections are more likely to be associated with rent extraction (for firms with similar 
observable characteristics and exposed to the same de jure regulations) when managers 
spend more time dealing with government officials, perceive that property rights are 
poorly enforced in the country or when the manager’s education is lower. The point   18
estimates again suggest that the main effect on training incidence is not driven by these 
concerns.  
Another potential concern is that there are unobservable factors linked with 
policies or institutions within each country that could simultaneously affect the incidence 
of job training at the firm level and the enforcement of the labor law in countries with 
different degrees of labor regulations. Columns (4) to (6) test the robustness of the main 
findings to alternative combinations of country, location, sector and size fixed effects. 
Again, we do not find any evidence that accounting for these effects significantly affects 
the main coefficient of interest. 
4.2. Endogeneity of Enforcement of Labor Market Regulations  
 
One of the main shortcomings of this approach is that the degree of enforcement 
of labor regulation could be endogenous to training incidence. In other words, it is 
possible that there are unobservable firm level characteristics driving simultaneously 
training incidence and the enforcement of labor regulation at the firm level at different 
degrees of stringency of labor codes.
18 One way to minimize this concern is to compute a 
more aggregate measure of the enforcement of labor regulation. We propose to proxy 
inspections faced by each firm with the average inspections in the country-region-sector 
and size where the firm is located (see e.g., Dollar et al, 2005).
19 This is arguably a more 
exogenous measure of enforcement to the incidence of job training in the firm, although 
it is still closely related to the enforcement faced by the firm itself. We compute the 
average number of inspections in the country, region, sector and size bracket where the 
firm is located (excluding the inspections faced by the firm itself).  
Table 5 reports the point estimates after clustering the stander errors at the same 
level of aggregation as mean inspections. The last row of the table reports the implied 
percentage point difference in training incidence for a firm facing the 90th percentile of 
the enforcement of labor regulation relative to a firm facing percentile 10th in a country 
with a rigid labor regulation (that is, in the 90th percentile of the rigidity of employment 
                                                 
18 Almeida and Carneiro (2007, 2008a) face the same problem and compute a measure of how costly is to 
supply enforcement in each Brazilian city (which is closely linked to travel time by car). Since in our data 
we do not know in which city each firm is located, we cannot compute an analogous instrument.  
19 Dollar et al (2005) propose a similar instrument for investment climate variables to determine their effect 
on firm performance.   19
index) relative to a country with a less rigid labor regulation (i.e., in the 10
th percentile). 
The degree of aggregation of inspections by sector of activity varies across the there 
columns.
20 The findings clearly confirm that there is a strong and positive correlation 
between training incidence and the degree of stringency of the de facto labor code faced 
by each firm. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effect increases significantly (last row 
of table 5). For example, the point estimate in column (1) implies that the magnitude of 
the effect of regulations on job training more than doubles to 7 percentage points, from 
3.4 percentage points in our basic specification (column (4) of table 3). The effect of 
labor inspections increases when disaggregating the sector classification.       
An alternative approach to mitigate the possible endogeneity concern of labor 
market regulations in equation (2) is to allow the effect of de facto regulations to vary on 
an additional dimension. We follow Micco and Pages (2007) and assume that the 
stringency of labor market regulations produces larger effects in more volatile sectors, 
i.e., in sectors with a larger intrinsic labor (or inputs) reallocation needs due to the 
volatility of demand and supply of shocks. This idea was first developed by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) and implemented in this type of literature by Micco and Pages (2007).
21 
Micco and Pages (2007) find that, across countries, some industries exhibit higher levels 
of job reallocation than others.
 22 This suggests that there are important technological or 
product market characteristics that determine the relative volatility of employment in a 
sector. However, the observed sector specific labor reallocation in each country is likely 
to be itself affected by labor market regulations institutions. Under the assumption that 
labor regulations affect level of sector reallocation, though not the ranking within a 
country, the rank correlations across countries is a good estimate of the true rank 
correlation in the absence of labor market regulations. They proxy the intrinsic relative 
labor volatility in a sector in a given country in absence of adjustment costs by the 
                                                 
20 In column (1) we consider 2 groups (manufacturing and services), in column (2) we consider 9 groups 
and in column (3) we consider 27 groups. 
21 This methodology has been applied in other fields namely in the finance literature (e.g., Claessens and 
Laeven, 2003, Galindo et al, 2002, Galindo and Micco, 2004, Raddatz, 2006, and Rajan and Zingales, 
1998). 
22 To identify an industry’s intrinsic demand for adjustment, Micco and Pages (2007) use the rank 
correlation (across sector) of sector job flows of excess reallocation. They find that correlations tend to be 
positive, statistically significant, and large. In other words, across countries, some industries exhibit higher 
levels of job reallocation than others. This suggests that there are important technological or product market 
characteristics that determine the relative volatility of employment in a sector.   20
relative job reallocation of that industry in the United States (which, according to 
different measures, has one of the more flexible labor codes in the world).  
The reduced form modeling the probability that firm i offering training is given by: 
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(3)  
where all the variables are as above and 
US
j V  is the US sector job reallocation in sector 
j.
23 The coefficient of interest now becomes φ .  φ  captures the differences in training 
intensity for firms exposed to different degrees of de facto regulations in sectors with a 
higher “intrinsic” labor reallocation relative to firms in sector with smaller labor 
reallocation needs.  
The results of estimating equation (3) by maximum likelihood (probit) are 
reported in table 6. Columns (1) to (3) differ in the control variables included. In column 
(2) we include the interactions relative to total inspections (not included in (1)) and in 
column (3) we include the interaction with country level GDP per capita , which is 
similar to our main specification in column (4) of table 3. Again, the findings suggest that 
there is a positive correlation between stringency of the law and the supply of formal 
training programs. The empirical estimates for φ  in column (2) and (3) are positive and 
strong suggesting that firms facing a stricter de facto labor regulation and in sectors that 
are intrinsically more volatile tend to offer more job training relative to sectors that are 
not so volatile in countries with a looser de facto regulation. The last row reports that the 
magnitude of the effect increases more than 4x to almost 15 percentage points.     
5. Sensitivity Analysis and Heterogeneity of the Effects 
 
In this section we test the robustness of the main specification (column (4) of 
table 3) to alternative samples (geographical region, income group and city location). 
Table 7 tests the robustness of the main findings when we exclude from the sample 
different regions of the world. In column (1) we exclude African and Middle Eastern 
                                                 
23 We thank Carmen Pages for helping us using this data set as in Micco and Pages (2006). The data can be 
downloaded from http://www.econ.umd.edu/~haltiwan/download.html.    21
countries (18%), in column (2) we exclude East and South Asia (33.3%), in column (3) 
we exclude countries in Eastern Europe (32.9%) and in column (4) we exclude Latin 
American countries (16%). As before, the point estimates show that, for all the sub 
samples of countries, training incidence tends to be higher for firms facing a stronger 
enforcement relative to firms facing a looser enforcement in countries where the overall 
labor market regulation is more rigid. However, the magnitude and strength of the effect 
seems to be driven by countries in East and South Asia as well as by Latin American 
countries, where training incidence tends to be higher. In columns (2) and (4), when we 
exclude these two groups from the sample, respectively, the coefficient of interest 
becomes smaller and statistically insignificant. Therefore, excluding any of these two 
regions, we cannot reject that training intensity does not depend on the stringency of 
labor regulation across the world.  
Column (5) of table 7 tests whether the link between enforcement of labor 
regulations and job training is different across low and middle income countries. We find 
that that training incidence is still positively correlated to the stringency of the de facto 
labor regulation when restricting the sample to the middle income countries. However, 
the magnitude of the effect becomes larger (5 percentage points) when we restrict the 
sample to middle income countries only. Finally, we test the robustness of our findings to 
the geographical location of firms. In our sample, more than 30% of the firms are located 
in the capital city and enforcement of the labor law also tends to be looser in the country 
capital city.
24 To the extent that training incidence is higher in capital cities (as reported 
in table 2), the geographical location could be biasing downwards the coefficient of 
interest (as long as these patterns are stronger when labor marker regulations are more 
rigid).
25 The results, reported in column (6), suggest that this is the case. Restricting the 
sample to firms located outside the capital city (although also in other cities) increases the 
                                                 
24 To investigate this we regress (log) labor inspections on firm size, location, openness, average worker 
education and public ownership and (log) total inspections, after controlling for country and sector fixed 
effects. All else constant, a firm located in the capital city has 14% lower labor inspections than firms else 
where. 
25 Brunello and De Paola (2008) and Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) find that training participation is 
lower in more agglomeration areas both in the U.K. and in Italy. They suggest that this is driven by higher 
turnover and poaching effects in more agglomerated areas. In our paper training incidence tends to be 
higher in the capital city. This could be explained, among other things, by larger pooling externalities 
associated with the diffusion of knowledge in larger cities of developing countries.      22
point estimate slightly, leading to a percentage point difference in training incidence 
between firms subject to different degrees of enforcement of labor regulation of 4 
percentage points.  
Manufacturing industries tend to be a more homogeneous and comparable group 
of firms across countries. In our sample, the manufacturing sector covers approximately 
73% of the sample. Table 8 tests whether the results are robust to this sub-sample. In 
column (1) we consider all the manufacturing firms while in columns (2) and (3) we 
consider the set of high and low-tech industries, respectively. The reason for splitting up 
the sample by technological sophistication is that manufacturing industries with a higher 
degree of technological sophistication could be pressured to innovate and train more 
frequently than traditional industries. The results reported in column (1) show that the 
effect of the de facto labor regulations on the incidence of training remains positive and 
strong when we restrict the sample to manufacturing firms. The magnitude of the effect 
increases slightly which is suggestive that firms in manufacturing could be more 
constrained by the effects of regulation than non-manufacturing firms. In particular, the 
point estimate implies that the incidence of job training for a firm facing the 90th 
percentile of the enforcement of labor regulation relative to a firm facing percentile 10th 
is approximately 5 percentage points higher in a country with a rigid labor regulation 
(that is, in the 90th percentile of Doing Business Index) than in a country with a less rigid 
labor regulation (in the 10
th percentile). Moreover, the effect seems to be mostly focused 
on the low-tech industries rather than in the high tech.
26  
In the previous discussion we have considered a general measure of rigidity of 
employment. This measure compiles stringency of the labor law with respect to three 
different dimensions: rigidity in hiring, rigidity in firing and rigidity in hours of work. 
Table 9 disaggregates the effect of the rigidity of labor regulations into specific 
components of the labor law (also obtained from the Doing Business data set). Column 
(1) replicates the basic specification (also reported in column (4) of table 3). Columns (2) 
to (6) replicate the basic specification but using alternative labor market rigidity indices: 
rigidity in hiring (capturing flexibility in fixed term contracts), rigidity in firing 
                                                 
26 We consider low tech industries the following sectors: Beverages, food, garments, leather, non-metallic 
and plastic materials, paper, other manufacturing, textiles, and wood and furniture (Parisi et al., 2006).   23
(capturing flexibility in firing permanent workers), firing costs (capturing total costs of 
firing permanent workers) and rigidity in hours of work (capturing flexibility in adjusting 
hours of work of permanent workers). The findings strongly suggest that de facto labor 
market flexibility affects job training in a non-linear way. On the one hand, the findings 
in column (2) and (5) show that improving the flexibility of the labor markets through 
fewer hiring regulations and more flexible working schedules (for example, through the 
diffusion of temporary contracts or allowing for nightshifts) is associated with a reduction 
of the investment in job training.
27 If firms are under-investing in job training, a potential 
benefit of having stricter hiring regulations is an increased investment in human capital 
(e.g., Wasmer, 2006). Reassuringly, our findings are qualitatively in line with Bassanini 
et al (2005) who explore household level data. They explore cross country and time series 
variation across de jure labor market regulations in 13 European countries and also find 
mixed effects of different types of labor regulations.  
On the other hand, the findings in columns (3) and (4) suggest that an increase in 
the degree of employment protection for permanent workers decreases the provision of 
job training by firms. However, the magnitude of the effect remains quite small with the 
percentage point difference in training incidence being 3 percentage points and 2.3 
percentage points lower for firms facing stricter firing regulations and more costly firing 
costs, respectively. This negative effect of rigidity in firing and of firing costs on training 
incidence can be explained, in a context of a search model with wage compression, by an 
increase in the bargaining power of the insiders which leads to an increase in wages and 
to a reduction in the investment supported by the firm (see e.g., Garibaldi and Violante, 
2004, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). Alternatively, firing costs might increase the 
heterogeneity of the labor force by increasing the cost of dismissing the low ability 
workers.
28  To the extent that training and ability are complements, firms with a more 
heterogeneous workforce should train less. 
                                                 
27 We investigate more in depth the channel driving this correlation. In particular we run our baseline 
specification using as dependent variable the average turnover in the firm and exploring variation in the de 
facto hiring regulations and flexibility in hours. We can never reject that the two variables are not 
statistically correlated. Unfortunately, the number of firms reporting information on average turnover is 
reduced (less than 50% of the sample). Therefore, one should be cautious when interpreting these findings.  
28 We also investigate more in depth the channel driving this correlation. In particular we run our baseline 
specification using as dependent variable a measure of how heterogeneous is the workforce (captured by 
the standard deviation of the share workers with different degrees of education). We find that firms facing a   24
6. Conclusion 
In a context of increasing openness and international competition, firms in 
developing countries struggle to constantly adapt their workforce to new technologies 
and organizational structures in order to remain competitive. Policymakers throughout 
the world are increasingly interested in understanding the determinants of the investment 
in skills in order for the countries to remain competitive in an international context. This 
paper analyzes the link between stringency of the de facto labor market regulations faced 
by firms and the incentive to invest in job training. We explore a large firm level data set 
across more than 65 developing countries throughout the world to investigate the link 
between strictness of the de facto labor regulations and job training.  
Our findings strongly support that a stricter labor code is associated with a higher 
investment by firms in the human capital of their employees. Training incidence for a 
firm facing the 90th percentile of the enforcement of labor regulation relative to a firm 
facing percentile 10th is 2.1 percentage points higher in a country with a rigid labor 
regulation (that is, in the 90th percentile of the rigidity of employment index) than in a 
country with a less rigid labor regulation (i.e., in the 10
th percentile). Nevertheless, the 
magnitude of the effect is quantitatively small (average training incidence in our sample 
is 45.2%). The findings also suggest significant heterogeneity by types of regulation. 
While stricter hiring regulations and rigidity in the working hours are associated with a 
higher investment in job training, stricter firing costs tend to be associated with reduced 
investment in job training by employers.  
In sum, our findings strongly suggest that labor market reforms that accelerate the 
diffusion of temporary contracts and, simultaneously, increase the protection of regular 
workers reduce the incentives of firms to invest in the human capital of their employees. 
We show that these findings are robust to several robustness checks. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
more costly and rigid firing costs tend to have a more heterogeneous workforce (coefficient is also 
statistically significant at 5% level).     25
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 Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Main Variables 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max
Training Incidence  34,135 0.452 0.498 0 1
Small (10-49) 34,135 0.379 0.485 0 1
Medium (50-99) 34,135 0.136 0.343 0 1
Large (100-249) 34,135 0.138 0.345 0 1
Very Large (+250) 34,135 0.162 0.369 0 1
Large City (dummy) 32,746 0.515 0.500 0 1
Age firm  32,877 17.290 16.615 0 215
Exporter  33,608 0.301 0.459 0 1
Minority Foreign Ownership  33,983 0.029 0.166 0 1
Majority Foreign Ownership  33,983 0.048 0.213 0 1
Full Foreign Ownership  33,983 0.061 0.239 0 1
Public Ownership  33,867 0.080 0.271 0 1
Share Skilled Workers  33,908 0.631 0.319 0 1
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank). Table 2. Determinants of the Investment On-the-Job Training
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Small (10-49) 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.16
[0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]***
Medium (50-99) 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]***
Large (100-249) 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.39
[0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]***
Very Large (+250) 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.46
[0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]***
Large City (dummy) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.008] [0.007]*** [0.008]***
Age firm  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]* [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]** [0.000]**
Exporter - 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]***
Minority Foreign Ownership  - 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05
[0.020]* [0.020]** [0.022] [0.020]** [0.021]**
Majority Foreign Ownership  - 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.06
[0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.017] [0.015]*** [0.016]***
Full Foreign Ownership  - 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
[0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.016]*** [0.014]*** [0.015]***
Public Ownership  - - 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02
[0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014]
Average Years Schooling Workforce - - - 0.03 - -
[0.002]***
Share Skilled Workers  ---- 0.006 0.014
[0.012] [0.012]
Industry  Fixed  Effects?    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Country  Fixed  Effects?    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Country - Industry Fixed Effects?  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 31,491 30,918 30,824 25,860 30,664 30,151
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank). 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offers formal on-the-job training to its employees. Table
reports the marginal effects (at mean values) on the firm's propensity to train from probit regressions. Robust standard errors are in
brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A.1. Micro firms (with
than 10 employees) is the omitted size group.Table 3: Incidence of On-the-Job Training, Labor Regulations and Enforcement of Regulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rigidity of Employment * Labor Inspections  0.00016 0.00013 0.00025 0.00024 0.00025 0.00024 0.00025 0.00025
[0.00007]** [0.00008]* [0.00009]*** [0.00010]** [0.00010]** [0.00010]** [0.00010]** [0.00009]***
Labor Inspections  0.0033 -0.00057 -0.00954 -0.00431 -0.00955 -0.00951 -0.00952 -0.01158
[0.00201] [0.00231] [0.00294]*** [0.00792] [0.00295]*** [0.00295]*** [0.00294]*** [0.00434]***
Rigidity of Employment * Total Inspections  - - -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00007
[0.00003]** [0.00003]** [0.00003]** [0.00003]** [0.00003]** [0.00003]**
Total Inspections  - - 0.00494 0.00493 0.00495 0.0049 0.00494 0.0049
[0.00105]*** [0.00105]*** [0.00105]*** [0.00105]*** [0.00105]*** [0.00105]***
GDP pc * Labor Inspections  - - - -0.00069 -0.00156 -0.00034 -0.00168 0.00018
[0.00095] [0.00138] [0.00147] [0.00144] [0.00030]
Rule of Law * Labor Inspections  - - - - 0.00203 - - -
[0.00227]
Regulatory Quality * Labor Inspections  - - - - - -0.00074 - -
[0.00226]
Gov. Control Corruption * Labor Inspections  - - ---- 0.00223 -
[0.00231]
Procedures to Start a Business * Labor Inspections  - - ----- 0.00014
[0.00030]
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country  Fixed  Effects  Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Fixed  Effects  Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30,327 27,358 27,358 27,358 27,358 27,358 27,358 27,358
Differential in Training Incidence P90-P10 0.022 0.018 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.035
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).  _
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offers formal on-the-job training to its employees. Table reports the marginal effects (at mean values) on the firm's propensity to train
from probit regressions. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A.1. Micro firms (with than 10 employees) is the
omitted size group. Table 4: Job Training and Enforcement of Labor Regulations: Robustness Checks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rigidity of Employment * Labor Inspections  0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
[0.00010]*** [0.00010]** [0.00011]*** [0.00010]** [0.00010]* [0.00010]**
Labor Inspections  -0.01017 -0.00435 -0.00628 0.00018 0.0088 0.00712
[0.00890] [0.00873] [0.00854] [0.00812] [0.00844] [0.00846]
Rigidity of Employment * Total Inspections  -0.00007 -0.00005 -0.00012 -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00008
[0.00003]** [0.00003] [0.00004]*** [0.00003]** [0.00003]** [0.00003]**
Total Inspections  0.00518 0.00415 0.00655 0.00523 0.0055 0.0056
[0.00114]*** [0.00124]*** [0.00128]*** [0.00112]*** [0.00109]*** [0.00108]***
Rigidity of Employment * Management Time Spent Dealing with Officials  -0.00003 -----
[0.00003]
Rigidity of Employment * Property Rights Enforced in the Country  - -0.00025 ----
[0.00073]
Rigidity of Employment * Manager's Education - - 0.00014 - - -
[0.00029]
GDP  pc  *  Labor  Inspections  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Basic  Firm  Level  Controls  Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Country-City-Sector Fixed Effects Included?  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Country-Size-Sector Fixed Effects Included?  No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Country-City-Size  Fixed  Effects  Included?  No No No No No Yes 
Observations 23,567 23,613 19,078 26,539 25,783 26,515
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank). 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offers formal on-the-job training to its employees. Table reports the marginal effects (at mean values) on the firm's
propensity to train from probit regressions using the base specification (in column (4) of table 3). Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.








Rigidity of Employment * Labor Inspections  0.0005 0.0005 0.0007
[0.00016]*** [0.00018]*** [0.00028]***
Labor Inspections  -0.0343 -0.0331 -0.0548
[0.01390]** [0.01566]** [0.02318]**
Rigidity of Employment * Total Inspections  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
[0.00005] [0.00006] [0.00008]*
Total Inspections  0.0056 0.0053 0.0069
[0.00175]*** [0.00197]*** [0.00280]**
GDP pc * Labor Inspections  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Included?  Yes  Yes  No 
Industry Fixed Effects Included?  Yes  Yes  No 
Observations 29,170 29,431 29,580
Differential in Training Incidence P90-P10 0.07 0.08 0.11
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank). 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offers formal on-the-job training to its employees. Table reports
the marginal effects (at mean values) on the firm's propensity to train from probit regressions using the base specification (in column (4) of
table 3). Column (1) to (3) measure inspections (labor and total) with average number of inspectors faced by the firm in the same country, city,
sector and size bracket. Column (1) considers 2 sector categories (manufacturing and services), column (2) considers 9 sector categories and
column (3) considers the 27 two-digit sector categories. Robust standard errors clustered at the level of aggregation reported at the top of each
column are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A.1. Micro firms
(with than 10 employees) is the omitted size group. Table 6: Job Training, Enforcement of Labor Regulations and Sector Volatility
(1) (2) (3)
Rigidity of Employment * Labor Inspections * Sector Volatility 0.00002 0.00006 0.00006
[0.00002] [0.00003]** [0.00003]**
Rigidity of Employment * Labor Inspections  0.00001 -0.00012 -0.00015
[0.00021] [0.00026] [0.00027]
Labor Inspections * Sector Volatility -0.00096 -0.00192 -0.00028
[0.00076] [0.00102]* [0.00231]
Rigidity Employment * Sector Volatility 0.00000 0.00020 0.00021
[0.00108] [0.00113] [0.00113]
Rigidity of Employment * Total Inspections * Sector Volatility - -0.00002 -0.00002
[0.00001]** [0.00001]**
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Included?  Yes  Yes  No 
Industry Fixed Effects Included?  Yes  Yes  No 
Labor Inspections Included? Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total Inspections Included?  No  Yes  Yes 
Rigidity of Employment * Total Inspections  No  Yes  Yes 
GDP pc * Labor Inspections  No  No  Yes 
Observations 20,855 20,855 20,855
Implied Coefficient  0.0005 0.0009 0.0009
Differential in Training Incidence P90-P10 0.089 0.148 0.155
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank) and Job reallocation (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offers formal on-the-job training to its employees. Table reports the
marginal effects (at mean values) on the firm's propensity to train from probit regressions using the base specification, which includes all the variables
in column (7) of table 2 (including country and industry fixed effects). Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at
5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A.1. Micro firms (with than 10 employees) is the omitted size group. Table 7. Determinants of the Investment On-the-Job Training: Robustness to Different Samples. 
Africa & 
MENA 
East & South 
Asia 
ECA LAC  Low Income  Capital City 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rigidity of Employment * Labor Inspections  0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
[0.00011]** [0.00014] [0.00011]*** [0.00011] [0.00011]*** [0.00011]**
Labor Inspections  -0.0247 0.0114 -0.0057 0.0058 -0.0133 -0.0058
[0.01148]** [0.01040] [0.00861] [0.00873] [0.01003] [0.00964]
Rigidity of Employment * Total Inspections  -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
[0.00004]* [0.00004] [0.00004]** [0.00003]** [0.00004]*** [0.00004]**
Total Inspections  0.0052 0.0026 0.0059 0.0048 0.0056 0.0052
[0.00118]*** [0.00152]* [0.00129]*** [0.00109]*** [0.00114]*** [0.00123]***
GDP  pc  *  Labor  Inspections  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Basic  Firm  Level  Controls  Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  Fixed  Effects  Included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Fixed  Effects  Included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,692 17,930 18,995 22,457 20,811 19,614
Differential in Training Incidence P90-P10 0.034 0.008 0.076 0.036 0.051 0.044
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank). 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offers formal on-the-job training to its employees. Table reports the marginal effects (at mean
values) on the firm's propensity to train from probit regressions using the base specification (column (4) in table 3). Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A.1. Micro firms (with than 10 employees)is the omitted size group. Column (1) excludes
those firms located in Africa and Middle East, column (2) excludes firms in East and South Asia, column (3) excludes firms in Eastern Europe, column (4) excludes firms in
Latin America, column (5) excludes firms in low income countries and column (6) excludes firms in the country capital city.   







Rigidity of Employment * Labor Inspections  0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
[0.00011]*** [0.00019] [0.00013]**
Labor Inspections  -0.00475 -0.00375 -0.00553
[0.00920] [0.01571] [0.01120]
Rigidity of Employment * Total Inspections  -0.00006 -0.00012 -0.00002
[0.00004] [0.00006]* [0.00005]
Total Inspections  0.00469 0.00590 0.00369
[0.00129]*** [0.00190]*** [0.00169]**
GDP pc * Labor Inspections  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects?   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 20,909 6,863 14,035
Differential in Training Incidence P90-P10 0.054 0.047 0.046
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank). 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offers formal on-the-job training to its employees. Table reports the
marginal effects (at mean values) on the firm's propensity to train from probit regressions using the base specification (column (4) of table 3).
Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A.1.
Micro firms (with than 10 employees) is the omitted size group. Column (1) considers only firms in manufacturing sectors, column (2) considers
only firms in high-tech manufacturing sectors and column (3) considers only firms in low-tech manufacturing sectors. Low-tech industries include










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Labor Regulation * Labor Inspections  0.00024 0.00010 -0.00010 -0.00005 0.00017
[0.00010]** [0.00004]** [0.00006]* [0.00003]* [0.00006]***
Labor Regulation * Total Inspections  -0.00007 -0.00004 0.00003 0.00002 -0.00003
[0.00003]** [0.00001]*** [0.00002]* [0.00001]*** [0.00002]*
Labor Inspections  -0.00431 0.00235 0.01028 0.00927 0.00052
[0.00792] [0.00696] [0.00840] [0.00794] [0.00696]
Total Inspections  0.00493 0.00395 0.0017 0.00142 0.00385
[0.00105]*** [0.00051]*** [0.00070]** [0.00061]** [0.00069]***
GDP pc * Labor Inspections  -0.00069 -0.00101 -0.00127 -0.00111 -0.00105
[0.00095] [0.00094] [0.00102] [0.00098] [0.00093]
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country  Fixed  Effects  Included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Fixed  Effects  Included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,358 27,358 27,358 27,358 27,358
Differential in Training Incidence P90-P10 0.034 0.036 -0.030 -0.023 0.034
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank). 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offers formal on-the-job training to its employees. Table reports the
marginal effects (at mean values) on the firm's propensity to train from probit regressions using the base specification, which includes all the
variables in column (7) of table 2 (including country and industry fixed effects). Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All variables are defined in Table A.1. Micro firms (with than 10 employees) is the omitted size group. Social Protection Discussion Paper Series Titles 
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